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Abstract:  This paper estimates a union wage effect, using matched e mployer-employee data and 
estimation models that control an association between a worker’s union status and an employer’s 
characteristics. Failure to control this association may cause previous studies’ estimates of the union wage 
effect to be biased. As long as a worker is more likely to become a union worker in a firm that offers her a 
higher potential for better pay, the union status is (positively) associated with employer characteristics. 
The empirical finding of this paper verifies this possibility. Estimates of the union wage effect are shown 
to be upward-biased in the estimation models without control of the employer characteristics. The 
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What do unions do in a wage determination? It is one of the widely addressed questions in
labor economics. Answering the question has been to measure the true wage premium to a
union worker relative to the hypothetically same non-union worker. In an eﬀort to measure this
union wage premium, labor economists found that a worker’s union status is not exogenous in
the wage determination. While union status may aﬀect a worker’s wage rate, the latter will also
inﬂuence the decision of the same worker in becoming a union worker.
Given the quite general agreement that a worker’s union status is endogenous, the main
question in measuring exactly the union wage premium is how to control the endogeneity in the
wage equation to avoid bias. In order to control this, labor economists have taken advantage
of various methods, depending on available data and objectives of the studies. Among others,
longitudinal methods, intrumental variable methods and sample-selectivity correction methods
are three of the most widely adopted econometric techniques. The longitudinal methods (Card
(1996), Freeman (1984), Jakubson (1991)) control unobservable individual component of wage
that aﬀects a worker’s union status in the form of unmeasurable individual attributes and pro-
ductivity. The instrumental variable methods (Duncan and Staﬀord (1980), Robinson (1989))
control the union status endogeneity by relying on instrumental variables. The approaches of
sample selection (Duncan and Leigh (1980), Lee (1978), Robinson and Tomes (1984)) focus on
the fact that a worker’s wage rate is observable only in one state (for example, union) and that
measuring the true union wage premium requires a hypothetical wage rate of the same worker
in the other state (for example, non-union). It views a wage rate as only being observable after
a worker’s endogenous decision to become a union worker is made.
In spite of the diﬀerences in their econometric speciﬁcations, however, these studies on union
wage diﬀerentials commonly specify a worker’s union status as aﬀected only by the worker’s
1personal characteristics – that may be either observable or unobservable to researchers – in
their estimation. In contrast to this line of literature, I view a worker’s union status as not only
associated with the worker’s personal characteristics, but with characteristics of the employer
(whether observable or unobservable to researchers). As long as a worker is more likely to become
a union worker with the employer that oﬀers higher potential for better pay, or as long as a ﬁrm
pays higher wages in the face of a worker’s greater likelihood of becoming a union worker, the
union status is positively associated with the employer characteristics that are closely related
with higher wage. In this case, a failure to control the association between a worker’s union
status and (compensation-related) characteristics of the employer may cause previous studies’
estimates of union wage eﬀect to be biased. In the speciﬁcations of the previous studies, the
employer’s characteristics are usually omitted, and these omitted variables are likely correlated
with a worker’s union status1. Based on this view, this paper re-estimates a union wage eﬀect
and evaluates the previous studies’ estimates of the eﬀect, using matched employer-employee
data that contain longitudinal information of employers as well as workers, and estimation
models that control employer eﬀects and its characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I illustrate the possibility
that an employer characteristic is associated with a worker’s union status by employing a widely
used U.S. national household survey data – the National Longitudinal Survey for Youth, 1979.
In Section 3, the estimation models that incorporate a worker’s ﬁrm attributes together with
personal ones are explained in the context of union wage eﬀect estimation. The data used for
the estimation is discussed in Section 4. The estimation results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
1There are some exceptions that have tried to consider the employer characteristics in the estimation of union
wage premium. Among others, Podgursky (1986) and Wunnava and Ewing (1999) control the establishment size
as a measure of employer characteristics in the estimation of union wage premium. However, this measure may
not be an ideal one, in that the characteristics of a ﬁrm will be more important in a wage determination, than
those of an establishment of the same ﬁrm. This issue will be revisited in a later section.
22 Union Density and Establishment Size
Many of the empirical studies on the determination of a worker’s union status2 specify it as
associated with personal characteristics. This implies that an individual worker’s likelihood
of becoming a union worker depends only on the worker’s personal characteristics. However,
as Abowd and Farber (1982) and Card (1996) point out, a worker’s observed union status is
not only determined by a worker’s desire to join a union. It is also aﬀected by the employer’s
selection from union applicants. Although an individual worker with this or that personal
characteristic is more (or less) inclined to join a union, her desire may not be realized unless
the employer’s decision coincides with the worker’s desire. If employers’ decision to employ
union workers systematically diﬀer, depending on their characteristics, a worker’s observed and
realized union status will be associated with the employer characteristics as well as with the
worker’s personal attributes.
Another explanation regarding the interaction between employer characteristics and worker’s
union status will be possible by relying on the framework of demand and supply of union. This
explanation speciﬁes the direction of the interaction in more detail. First, take a look at the
supply and cost aspects of the union membership. Focusing on the employer size, among
other factors, that is measured by the total number of employees in an establishment in which
an individual works, there will be economies of scale in union organization. As discussed in
Bramley, Wunnava, and Robinson (1989) and Wunnava and Ewing (1999), the likelihood of
unionization is higher in larger ﬁrms or establishments, since larger ones provide larger pools
of workers than smaller ones. The larger worker pool means a lower cost of unionization for
the union organizers. Second, when looking at the demand side, there is evidence that a ﬁrm
with a larger number of employees or with some degree of market power in the product market
2In these studies as well as in this paper, a worker’s union status is measured by collective bargaining coverage.
That is, one is a union worker as long as her wage contract is covered by the collective bargaining agreement
between the ﬁrm and union (or similar employee association).
3will better pay its employees in the form of economic rents (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
(1999), Brown and Medoﬀ (1989), Stewart (1990), Bell (1995)). Given that a union is expected
to improve union workers’ wages, a worker is more willing to become a union worker in a ﬁrm
that oﬀers a higher potential for better pay. This tendency will therefore lead to a higher union
density in such ﬁrms in combination with lower costs of unionization.
This positive association between employer characteristics and union density is illustrated
by the empirical ﬁnding that follows. Using the 1986, 1989 and 1993 waves of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 (hereafter NLSY79), I construct each year’s series of union
density with respect to the establishment size reported in the data3. As is illustrated in hFigure
1i, the union density – the proportion of union workers in each category of the establishment size
– generally increases as an establishment hires larger number of workers. In an establishment
with less than 10 employees, for example, only 8 to 10 percent of the total number of employees
are union workers. In contrast, 23 to 26 percent of the employees are union workers in an
establishment with 100 to 200 employees. The proportion becomes higher for an establishment
with more than 3,000 employees.
INSERT hFigure 1i
Although this simple empirical ﬁnding implies a positive association between employer char-
acteristics and the individual worker’s likelihood of becoming a union worker, the establishment
size has a limitation, when used as a measure for employer characteristics that aﬀect a worker’s
wage as well as a worker’s union status. It may not be true that a component of a worker’s
wage related to employer’s characteristics is determined within the level of establishment, and
3An establishment is an economic unit, such as a farm, mine, factory, or store, that produces goods or provides
services. It is typically at a single physical location and engaged in one, or predominantly one, type of economic
activity. Thus, a single ﬁrm may have multiple establishments. The reason I use the establishment size (on
behalf of the ﬁrm size) as an employer characteristic here is that it is a widely used and unique measure for
employer characteristic that is available in the original NLSY79 data. I will rely on other measures for employer
characteristics such as the volume of a ﬁrm’s sales or the total number of employees in the ﬁrm in the main
analysis using matched employer-employee data.
4that a worker desires to become a union worker in reference to the establishment’s economic
performances. Rather, what matters to a worker’s wage and union status will be the character-
istics of a ﬁrm as a whole rather than those of establishment(s) of the same ﬁrm4. In models
of wage determination under the inﬂuence of a product market, as well, the matter of interest
is the ﬁrm’s position, not the single establishment’s position, in the product market.
This consideration leads us to emphasize the characteristics of ﬁrms rather than those of
establishments in the estimation of union wage premium. Thus, the estimation model suggested
in later sections will mainly consider ﬁrm eﬀects as a measure of the employer characteristics.
Estimation results that consider the establishment eﬀects (measured by the employee size of a
establishment) as well as the ﬁrm eﬀects, however, will be reported later as a supplement to the
main results .
3 Estimation Models
A main model that is adopted for our estimation of the union wage eﬀect is described as follows
;
Wit = X0
it¯1 + Uit¯2 + Z0
i´ + ®i + ÃJ(i;t) + ²it (1)
where Wit is the logarithm of an individual i’s hourly wage rate at date t; Xit and Zi are vectors
of time-varying and non time-varying exogenous characteristics of individual i, respectively; Uit
is a dummy variable for i’s union status at t that takes 1 if i is a union worker and 0 otherwise;
®i is the unobservable person eﬀect; ÃJ(i;t) is the ﬁrm eﬀect for the ﬁrm at which worker i
is employed at date t (denoted by J(i;t)); and ²it is the statistical residual with mean 0 and
4Even and Macpherson (1994) make a distinction between ﬁrm size and establishment size and contend that
the former eﬀects clearly dominate the eﬀects of the latter. They attribute this pattern to the scale economies in
the administration of fringe beneﬁts that are likely related to ﬁrm size, and not establishment size. Brown and
Medoﬀ (1989) summarize studies that report the independent eﬀect of ﬁrm size and establishment size on wages.
5variance ¾2
² given other right-hand side variables5.
As long as an individual’s union status is aﬀected by (or is correlated with) the unobservable
person eﬀect and the ﬁrm eﬀect, estimation models that fail to control either of them in the
estimation of union wage eﬀect are exposed to bias. The direction of the bias will depend on
the nature of the relationship between union status and the omitted variable(s). Speciﬁcally,
an estimation model will produce a biased estimate for union wage eﬀect, if it treats every
observation as independent and does not, as a result, explicitly take account of the unobservable
person eﬀect and the ﬁrm eﬀect. Expecting that a worker’s union status is positively correlated
with each of these two eﬀects6, we anticipate that the estimated union eﬀect is upward-biased7.
An estimation model that relies on an individual panel data8 and controls the unobservable
person eﬀect may also produce a biased result, if the ﬁrm eﬀect is not considered. The latter’s
positive correlation with a worker’s union status makes the estimated union eﬀect upward-
biased, as well. In this study, in contrast, I use a matched employer-employee data set that
makes it possible to identify diﬀerent ﬁrms and the characteristics of the ﬁrms that a particular
individual has worked for in his/her work history over time. This data set enables us to control
the ﬁrm eﬀects as well as the unobservable person eﬀects in the estimation, although detailed
treatments of them vary among the estimation methods.
In the matched panel data analysis, I implement two methods that diﬀer in the way of
treating the unobservable person eﬀects and ﬁrm eﬀects in the estimation. The ﬁrst method
5Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999) have also used similar speciﬁcations
to analyze their matched employer-employee data
6The positive correlation between union status and the person eﬀect has been explained in the following two
ways. First, a worker with a higher unobservable attribute is more likely to join a union, since anticipated
earnings in a union is higher than in non-union alternative (Duncan and Leigh (1980), Lee (1978)). Second, a
union worker has a higher unmeasured (by researchers) productivity, since employers respond to higher union
wages by raising hiring standards (Pettengill (1980), Pencavel (1981)). However, the positive correlation between
union status and the ﬁrm eﬀect has not been highlighted as much. From the ﬁnding of higher union density in
larger establishments, and persistent employer-size wage diﬀerentials reported by other studies, we can infer that
a worker is more likely to be a union worker in ﬁrms that oﬀer a higher potential for better pay.
7Until given proper consideration, we shall set aside the issue of measurement errors that cause the estimates
to be biased toward zero(so-called attenuation bias).
8To distinguish it from the matched panel data, I will call the panel data without longitudinal information of
employers the individual panel data.
6employed is the ﬁxed eﬀects method, which views the unobservable person eﬀects and ﬁrm eﬀects
as time-constant ﬁxed components of a worker’s wage. The second method is the random eﬀects
method, which speciﬁes the unobservable person and ﬁrm eﬀects as random variables generated
by relevant statistical processes9. These two estimation methods have their own merits and
weakness that can be supplemented by each other, giving rise to the same interpretation of the
results.
The ﬁxed eﬀects method in our estimation is very simple and straightforward, in that it
views the unobservable person eﬀects (®i) and ﬁrm eﬀects (ÃJ(i;t)) as sets of parameters and
estimates them together with other interesting parameters. It is also intuitively appealing that
we add variables that are omitted and, thus, cause bias in simpler models, and that we allow for
any forms of association between union status, and ®i or ÃJ(i;t) in the estimation. In spite of
these merits, however, this method is known to be exposed to some limitations in its application
to our matched data analysis.
Among other things, the ﬁxed eﬀects methods are, in general, more vulnerable (than the
random eﬀects methods) to measurement errors, which bias the estimated eﬀect toward zero.
This problem arises mainly from the fact that they are basically diﬀerence-based estimation
methods rather than level-based ones. Intuitively, a measurement error of an observation at one
date is conﬁned to this date in estimation of the level-based methods, whereas, in the diﬀerence-
based methods, one date’s measurement error can spill over to the other dates’ transformed
values of calculation in taking mean-diﬀerences or any kind of diﬀerences10. Studies on union
wage eﬀects very often indicate that the measurement errors of workers’ reported union status
9Abowd and Kramarz (1999) explain the relationship between ﬁxed and random eﬀects speciﬁcations and
correctly point out economists’ confusion about the comparison of the two in the literature on matched employer-
employee data. They name the economists’ random eﬀects model the mixed (eﬀects) model, in order to make
their econometric speciﬁcations coherent with the statistical literature on these types of models. In this paper,
however, I follow the old (possibly misleading from a statistical viewpoint) term of the random eﬀects methods
to better contrast with the ﬁxed eﬀects methods.
10See Griliches and Hausman (1986), Freeman (1984) and Chowdhury and Nickell (1985) regarding the mea-
surement error that exacerbates the bias in diﬀerence-based estimation methods for panel data.
7are one of the main obstacles in obtaining true union eﬀects on wage11.
In addition, although it is speciﬁc only to our data analysis, the ﬁxed eﬀects method may
suﬀer from a sampling bias of our matched data set in considering the ﬁrm eﬀects as well as
the union wage eﬀect. Ideally, the ﬁrm eﬀects (i.e. ÃJ(i;t) in our speciﬁcation) in individuals’
wage constructs are the part of the wage that is shared by all employees in the same ﬁrm and,
thereby, can be correctly measured when one has the wage information of all employees in that
ﬁrm available. This is possible only in ideal employer-employee matched data that is derived
from administrative sources. Our data set, which is basically derived from a household survey,
lacks this ideal property for matched data, as it has available only a small portion of employees
of any ﬁrm identiﬁed in the data set12. This may cause a bias in the estimates of ﬁrm eﬀects,
and it may inﬂuence the estimates of the union wage eﬀect of our main interest.
In contrast, the random eﬀects method13 can supplement the ﬁxed eﬀects method while also
serving as its alternative. It is less sensitive to the problem of measurement errors, since it is a
level-based method, and to small number of employees identiﬁed as working for the same ﬁrm,
since a ﬁrm’s administrative records are used for controlling the ﬁrm eﬀects.
In our speciﬁcation, the random eﬀects method views ®i and ÃJ(i;t) as random variables
derived from (assumed) respective distributions and takes account of this statistical property
in the estimation step. Speciﬁcally, it relies on the maximum likelihood (ML) method for esti-
mation, and ®i and ÃJ(i;t) are integrated out as variables causing nuisance, in the construction
of the likelihood function of wage rate. The ML method is preferred to a least squares method
for estimation, since variance components of ®i and ÃJ(i;t) should remain positive, and this
11Freeman (1984) and Card (1996) make detailed descriptions of the inﬂuence of measurement errors associated
with union status on the estimated union wage eﬀect.
12As a result, the ﬁrm eﬀects estimated in our data analysis are, to be more exact, the ﬁxed eﬀects of ﬁrms
shared only by those employees identiﬁed in the data set, which may not be representative of all employees in
the same ﬁrm.
13To the best of my knowledge, Abowd and Kramarz (1999) is the ﬁrst paper that suggests using a mixed
(eﬀects) model (i.e. a random eﬀects model, in this paper’s terminology) to analyze matched employer-employee
data.
8property may not be maintained in the latter method14. In the integration of ®i and ÃJ(i;t) in
the likelihood function, it is usually assumed that they are orthogonal to the other observable
explanatory variables (such as Xit and Uit in our case). This assumption, however, is highly
questionable in statistical application to economic data, let alone in our estimation of union
wage eﬀect. To control the association with Xit and Uit, following Mundlak (1978) and Cham-
berlain (1982), I model ®i as a function of within-individual mean of each variable, and ÃJ(i;t)
as a function of ﬁrm’s characteristics, as follows;
®i = X0
i¢°1 + Ui¢°2 + &i (2)
ÃJ(i;t) = F0
jt°3 + Àj (3)
where Xi¢ and Ui¢ are i’s mean vector of Xit and Uit over all t, respectively; Fjt is a vector of
observable ﬁrm j(= J(i;t))’s characteristics at t; and &i and Àj are statistical errors following
N(0;¾2
&) and N(0;¾2
À) that are associated with ®i and Ãj, respectively15. It is assumed that &i
and Àj are independent of each other as well as of Xit; Uit and Fjt. Given these speciﬁcations,
&i or Àj are actually integrated out in the construction of the likelihood function, instead of ®i
or ÃJ(i;t).
In contrast to its advantages described earlier, the random eﬀects method also has two main
drawbacks. First, arbitrariness may arise when constructing a model of random eﬀects. Since
14As also pointed out by Abowd and Kramarz (1999), the statistical models and estimation methods discussed
here are very similar to those appearing in statistical and biometric literature under the subject ‘generalized
linear mixed models’. The diﬀerence exists in the fact that ÃJ(i;t) in our model is speciﬁed as non-nested random
eﬀect, while it is usually speciﬁed as nested (within a same i) eﬀect in theirs. The other model of ours (to be
presented shortly) with job eﬀects (i.e job match eﬀect or person-ﬁrm interaction eﬀects) on behalf of ﬁrm eﬀects
is the same as the generalized linear mixed models, since the job eﬀect is nested within a same i. See Searle,
Casella, and McCulloch (1992, Ch.6) for speciﬁcations and estimation methods of the ‘generalized linear mixed
models’.
15Instead of the linear form, one may try other functional forms of association between Xit and Uit, on the
one hand, and ®i and Ãj, on the other hand. However, given that a linear equation is a general approximation
to a wage equation as long as all the necessary explanatory variables are included along with their higher order
terms (such as quadratic and cubic terms, for instance), this linear form will not cause serious problems in
approximating the association of our interest.
9it relies on the ML estimation method, it may be vulnerable to a speciﬁcation of the statistical
properties of random variables and, as a result, to mis-speciﬁcation of them. In addition, the
mis-speciﬁcation that may be associated with the equations (2) and (3) given earlier may not
guarantee the independence of &i and Àj. If there remains something uncontrolled in (2) and
(3), it may cause the independence assumption for &i and Àj to fail. Second, a large number
of observations are lost when using a ﬁrm’s administrative records as part of the explanatory
variables in the wage equation. In our analyzed data, about 40 percent of the observations that
have a ﬁrm’s identiﬁcation conﬁrmed fail to also have its accounting information (such as total
employee size, sales etc.) incorporated. As a result, using it as a set of explanatory variables
leads to the loss of those observations. In contrast, the ﬁxed eﬀects method, which uses only
the ﬁrm’s identiﬁcation while neglecting the accounting information, can avoid this limitation.
In sum, given their own merits and drawbacks as described so far, when interpreting the
estimation results on the union wage eﬀect, I do not make exclusive use of one of the two
methods of estimation. Instead, I implement both methods and give an equal amount of weight
to each method of the ﬁxed and random eﬀects. Thus, I report the true union wage eﬀect as a
range of estimates that are provided by each method.
Using the aforementioned complementarity of the ﬁxed and random eﬀects methods, I try
another speciﬁcation that can also supplement the estimation of union wage eﬀect based on the
ﬁrm eﬀects model. This is the job eﬀects model, which is very similar to the model speciﬁcation
given by the equation (1) with one exception that job eﬀects are incorporated into the speciﬁca-
tion of wage rates on behalf of the ﬁrm eﬀects. This job eﬀects model supplements the results
of the ﬁrm eﬀects model on the basis of diﬀerent observation units of comparison. While the
ﬁrm eﬀects model compares the wage rates of hypothetically same (except for the union status)
workers in the same ﬁrm, the job eﬀects model does the same comparison within the same job
match. This job match is unique for a particular individual in a particular ﬁrm. Nonetheless,
10it implies no diﬀerence in the interpretation of the union wage eﬀect estimated from the ﬁrm
eﬀects model. The estimate is interpreted as a diﬀerence in wage rates between a union and
non-union worker in the same job match (that is, in the same ﬁrm) who are, hypothetically,
exactly same in all other respects. Given the unchanged interpretation of the results, the use
of the job eﬀects model is due, in particular, to the computational convenience of the random
eﬀects method. In constructing the likelihood function, the ﬁrm eﬀects model involves an inte-
gration of the random terms across diﬀerent individuals sharing the same ﬁrm eﬀect, while the
job eﬀects model involves their integration within the same individual. The latter produces far
greater advantages in the computation.
The job eﬀects model is described as follows;
Wit = X0
it¯1 + Uit¯2 + Z0
i´ + ®i + 'ij + ²it (4)
where 'ij is the job eﬀect of an individual i’ with a ﬁrm j. It is interpreted as an interaction eﬀect
between an individual and a ﬁrm, or a job match-speciﬁc eﬀect that is unique for an individual
within a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Likewise, a ﬁxed eﬀects method treating ®i and 'ij as parameters, and a
random eﬀects method treating them as random variables are applied. To control an association
with Xit and Uit in the random eﬀects method, 'ij is modelled as follows ;
'ij = F0
jt°3 + X0
i¢(j)°4 + ºij (5)
where Xi¢(j) is i’s mean vector of Xit over all t within same ﬁrm j, and ºij is a statistical error
following N(0;¾2
º) that is associated with 'ij.
114 Data
For this study, I use match employer-employee data based on the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth, 1979 cohort. This data set was constructed by Abowd and Finer (1999) in which
an individual’s job-related information provided by the NLSY79 was linked to information of
ﬁrms that hired the same individual. They compared and matched employer names and other
company information (industry, employment size, location, etc.) reported in the NLSY79 with
those provided by Standard and Poors COMPUSTAT, the Center for Research on Security
Prices at the University of Chicago, and the Directory of Corporate Aﬃliation given by the
National Register Publishing Company16. They were able to match a total of 33,979 observations
with 4,002 valid employers for 6,673 individuals for the period between 1986 and 1994. Firm’s
sales, operating income, value of capital and number of total employees as well as a ﬁrm’s
identiﬁcation comprise the ﬁrm information available from the data for each year from 1986 to
1994.
Originally, the NLSY79 data have 113,855 observations for 10,843 individuals for the survey
years 1986-94. Our ﬁnal matched data is about a 30 percent sample of the original data with
33,979 observations for 6,673 individuals for the same sample period. hTable 1i compares de-
scriptive statistics for the matched data with those for the original NLSY79 sample for 1986-94.
INSERT hTable 1i
There exist slight but negligible diﬀerences between the original sample and matched sample
in terms of pure personal characteristics. The means and standard deviations of age, years of
experience and schooling, and the proportion of those married, male and white are very similar.
In contrast, some diﬀerences exist between two samples in terms of characteristics that vary
within and across ﬁrms. First of all, the establishment size of the matched sample is nearly
16See Abowd and Finer (1999) for the detailed process in which individual jobs in NLSY79 are matched with
employers.
12twice as large as the original sample. Employees in large establishments and, thereby, in large
ﬁrms are reasonably expected to be matched better. The matched sample is also composed of
those workers who are paid slightly higher wage rates, work longer hours a week, stay in a ﬁrm
for more years and are more likely to be union workers. Slightly longer working hours in the
matched sample is explained, as it contains a higher proportion (82 percent) of those working
on a full-time basis than in the original sample (76 percent). In addition, the matched sample
contains higher mean years of tenure, because the match rate increases as a worker’s tenure
increases. For example, the match rates for 5, 10, and 15 years of tenure are 48.8, 58.6 and
63.6 percent, respectively (Abowd and Finer (1999, Table 13, p.36)). Given the diﬀerence in
match rates over working hours and tenure, and the observation that a strong attachment to
a ﬁrm drives a high match rate, we can expect a higher proportion of union workers in the
matched sample. As long as union workers are more likely to be full-time workers and to stay
in a ﬁrm longer17, their match rate would be higher, as veriﬁed in the table by the higher ratio
of union workers in the matched sample. For a similar reason, a slightly higher mean wage of
the matched sample would be a form of compensation for the strong attachment to a ﬁrm.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Models with No Control of Firm Eﬀects
In this section, as an intermediate step, the estimated union wage eﬀect is reported for the
models that do not have control of the ﬁrm eﬀects. The ﬁrst simplest model is the one that
has no control of unobservable person eﬀects and ﬁrm eﬀects, and produces the cross-sectional
estimate for the union wage eﬀect. It treats the whole term of ®i; ÃJ(i;t) and ²it in equation (1)
17In the original NLSY79 sample, the proportion of union workers are 17.6 and 10.1 percent among full-time
and part-time workers, respectively. A union worker’s mean years of tenure is 3.53 years, while a non-union
member’s is 2.48 years.
13as an error term, while dealing with every individual observation as an independent observation.
hTable 2i displays its estimation results.
INSERT hTable 2i
According to the table, union workers get paid approximately 15.1 percent higher, on av-
erage, than non-union workers18. In more detail, the wage rates of male union workers are
approximately 17.9 percent higher than male non-union workers. In contrast, female union
workers have an approximate 11.0 percent higher wage rate than female non-union workers.
Union wage eﬀect is a little stronger for male workers than their female counterparts. As dis-
cussed earlier, however, these estimates for the union eﬀect are likely to be exposed to upward
bias, as long as each of ®i and ÃJ(i;t) is positively associated with Uit among others19.
The second model has been designed to partly overcome this endogeneity problem by con-
sidering unobservable person eﬀect in the regression and using individual panel data for an
individual’s work history20. This model explicitly includes ®i in estimation and considers ÃJ(i;t)
and ²it in equation (1), as a whole, as an error term, treating each observation as indepen-
dent, given observable explanatory variables and ®i. hTable 3i reports estimation results of this
model. The ﬁxed eﬀects method views ®i as a parameter and estimates it for every i using the
least squares method. In contrast, the random eﬀects method considers ®i as a random variable
and controls the association with observable variables through equation (2).
INSERT hTable 3i
Overall, the second model produces smaller estimates for union wage eﬀect than the ﬁrst
one. When we examine the estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀects method, union workers are estimated to
18This amount of union wage premium is very similar to the cross-sectional estimates of Lewis (1986, Table
20.1, p.1164) and Jakubson (1991, Table 1, p.977) for U.S. data.
19There is, however, a possibility that these estimates are downward-biased due to measurement errors associ-
ated with workers’ reported union status. The measurement error problem will be discussed and explicitly dealt
with in section (5.3.1).
20I will refer to the estimate given by this model as the individual panel estimate, in contrast to the matched
panel estimate of this paper’s focus.
14get paid approximately 7.4 percent higher, on average, than non-union workers21. This degree
of union eﬀect is just half of the estimate given by the former model (i.e. 15.1 percent). When
looking at the eﬀect for males and females separately, the wage rates of male and female union
workers are approximately 8.3 and 6.2 percent higher than those of their non-union counterparts.
These amounts are also about half of those given by the former model (i.e. 17.9 and 11.0 percent,
respectively). The estimates of the random eﬀects method conﬁrms that the union wage eﬀect
is weaker for either male, female or for both than when estimated in the model without a control
for the unobservable person eﬀect.
In addition, it is worth noting that these estimates of the random eﬀects method are very
close to those of the ﬁxed eﬀects method. This observation sheds some light on the issue of
measurement error. Generally, if measurement errors are uncorrelated over time, a downward
bias arising from the errors is much more severe in a diﬀerence-based estimation method (such as
a ﬁxed eﬀects method) than in a level-based method (such as a random eﬀects method). Given
the possibility of a severe downward bias of the estimated union eﬀect of our ﬁxed eﬀects method
and the similar estimates of our random eﬀects method, we may infer that the measurement
error may not be a big problem when using the NLSY79 matched data to estimate the union
wage eﬀect. With a large measurement error, the estimated union eﬀect would be fairly diﬀerent
when using the ﬁxed and random eﬀects methods.
5.2 Models with Controls of Firm Eﬀects and Job Eﬀects
The two models given previously with no controls of ﬁrm eﬀects are the ones usually used in the
studies of union wage eﬀect with many variations of speciﬁcations (Duncan and Leigh (1980),
Jakubson (1991), Robinson (1989) and Card (1996) and etc.). In contrast, the estimation model
of our study is unique in the sense that it controls the ﬁrm eﬀect explicitly, and avoids the bias
21This amount of the union wage premium is also very similar to the individual panel estimates of Jakubson
(1991, Table 2, p.979) under homoscedasticity that are obtained using PSID, 1976-1980.
15that may arise from the association between workers’ union status and ﬁrm characteristics.
As discussed in Section 3, the ﬁrst model applied to is a model with ﬁrm eﬀects. In controlling
the ﬁrm eﬀects, I use three diﬀerent speciﬁcations for each method of the ﬁxed and random
eﬀects. In the ﬁxed eﬀects method, one speciﬁcation uses ﬁrms’ identiﬁcation only, while the
other speciﬁcations use information of sales per employee and number of total employees in
the ﬁrm. In the random eﬀects method, the ﬁrm eﬀects are controlled by sales per employee,
operating income per employee, or total number of ﬁrm employees. Note that the speciﬁcations
with controls of ﬁrms’ accounting records lead to losses in analytic observations that have ﬁrm
identiﬁcations, while missing the information on those variables. hTable 4i and hTable 5i report
the ﬁxed and random eﬀects estimation results, respectively, of the model with the ﬁrm eﬀects22.
The diﬀerent speciﬁcations are labelled as (1), (2) and (3) in the tables.
INSERT hTable 4i
INSERT hTable 5i
According to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, the union wage eﬀect does not really exist as much
for the whole sample. As long as two workers who are identical with respect to tenure, experience
and unobservable personal characteristics work in the same ﬁrm, their wage rates do not diﬀer
as much as is estimated by previous models without the ﬁrm eﬀects, whether or not they are
union workers (that is, whether their wages are set by a union contract or not, following our
deﬁnition of union workers). A union worker receives only an approximate 0.2 percent higher
wage rate, on average, than a non-union worker (who is otherwise identical) in the same ﬁrm.
This amount of union wage premium is not even statistically signiﬁcant. In addition, it turns
out that this result is an outcome of counteracting eﬀects between male and female workers. A
22For the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, I make use of a module “Proc GLM” in SAS. For the random eﬀects
estimation, I use a statistical software “GenStat”. See GenStat 5 Committee (1993) for the description of the
method. I acknowledge John M. Abowd’s permission to use this software in the CISER computing facilities in
Cornell University.
16male union worker receives an approximate 0.9»2.5 percent higher wage rate, on average, than
a male non-union worker (who is otherwise identical) in the same ﬁrm, although the amount of
the union wage eﬀect varies slightly depending on the ﬁrm characteristics used. In contrast, a
female union worker gets paid approximately 0.5»2.3 percent less, on average, than a female
non-union worker (who is, again, otherwise identical) in the same ﬁrm. Although the estimate
of the ﬁxed eﬀects method can be limited by the measurement errors and the relatively small
number of ﬁrm employees identiﬁed, as indicated earlier, this result is quite surprising. A union
wage eﬀect estimated without a control of ﬁrm eﬀects appears to be upward-biased due to the
association between union status and uncontrolled ﬁrm eﬀects in the wage equation.
This observation is readily conﬁrmed by the random eﬀects estimates of the union wage
eﬀect. Although it shows a slightly more pronounced wage eﬀect than given by the ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates, a union fails to increase union workers’ wages as much as expected by previous
studies that have no control of ﬁrm eﬀects. For the whole sample, a union worker receives
an approximate 3.1»3.2 percent higher wage rate, on average, than a non-union worker in the
same ﬁrm. As expected from the ﬁxed eﬀect results, union wage eﬀect is stronger among male
workers than among female workers. A male union worker receives an approximate 4.6»4.7
percent higher wage rate than a male non-union worker in the same ﬁrm. In contrast, a female
union worker gets paid approximately 0.9»1.0 percent (statistically insigniﬁcant) more than a
female non-union worker in the same ﬁrm. These estimated union eﬀects are less than a quarter
of those previously given by models without control of unobservable person and ﬁrm eﬀects,
and less than half of those with a control of unobservable person eﬀect only.
Having the above estimation results available, we are now able to decompose the union wage
premium given by the individual panel estimates into two diﬀerent components. Suppose the
17following equation is estimated in absence of the ﬁrm eﬀects control;
Wit = X0
it¯1 + Uit¯2 + Z0
i´ + ®i + eit
where eit = ÃJ(i;t) + ²it.
Then, it is known that the estimated ¯2 will converge in the limit to the true ¯2 plus a
part proportional to Cov(Uit;ÃJ(i;t)). The ﬁrst component (i.e. the true ¯2) is the wage rate of
union workers as increased by union activities, compared with those of non-union workers (who
are otherwise identical) in the same ﬁrm. This is exactly what is estimated in our study. In
contrast, the second component is an amount of bias associated with individual panel estimates
due to the uncontrolled covariation between a worker’s union status and a ﬁrm eﬀect. As long
as the individual panel estimate of union wage premium is smaller than the estimate of our
model with ﬁrm eﬀects, the association between a union status and a ﬁrm eﬀect turns out to
be positive and, thereby, the individual panel estimate is upward-biased. From the estimation
results above, it turns out that approximately (at least) 58 percent of the individual panel
estimates is due to the uncontrolled association between the union status and ﬁrm eﬀect and
the remaining (at most) 42 percent is the true union premium in the same ﬁrm.
Given these lower estimates for the union wage eﬀects, one may conceive that a union has
little capability to increase union workers’ wages in general, and may reach the conclusion
that a union does not play a big role in wage determination. However, this conjecture and
conclusion is not completely true. Although a union worker’s wage rate is only slightly higher
than a non-union worker’s in the same ﬁrm, the union worker receives wage rates that are
higher by the individual panel estimates, on average, than a non-union worker who is in a
diﬀerent ﬁrm. As long as a union has the power to drive the covariance part (Cov(Uit;ÃJ(i;t)))
upward, it has the capability of increasing union workers’ wages and, thereby, workers will have
18enough of an incentive to become union workers. However, from our data and econometric
speciﬁcations, the source of the increased covariation between union status and ﬁrm eﬀects of
compensation in union sectors is unclear. It may be due to the physical power of unions in
having employers divide a greater portion of the economic rent to union workers, or due to
employers’ compensation policies in the face of union threats (the threat eﬀect, for example).
Searching for the sources of covariation between a worker’s union status and ﬁrm characteristics
will be a subject of further study.
The case of a reduced union wage eﬀect reiterates in the other speciﬁcation of the model
with job eﬀects on behalf of ﬁrm eﬀects. The job eﬀect is derived from an interaction between a
person and a ﬁrm in a speciﬁc job match. It should be noted that the ﬁxed job eﬀects estimates
are identical to the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects estimates. They are so not only for the union estimate, but
for the other estimates, too. This is because both estimation methods of ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects and
job eﬀects are derived from an identical data set and from within-job diﬀerence-based methods
that are common to them in conceptual sense. While the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects method estimates
each ﬁrm eﬀect and the ﬁxed job eﬀects method estimates each job eﬀect, within-job diﬀerences
of time-varying variables are exactly the same in both methods, whether the speciﬁcations given
by the equation (1) or (4) are adopted. Since the within-job diﬀerences of the variables are used
in the calculation of ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, the ﬁxed job eﬀects estimates happen to be identical
to the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects estimates.
As a result, the ﬁxed job eﬀects estimates reiterate the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects results of the union
wage eﬀect, which displays very small eﬀect of union on wage rates for the whole sample. A union
worker receives an approximate 0.2 percent higher wage rate than his non-union counterpart, on
average, while the union wage eﬀect is more pronounced among male workers than among female
workers. When we turn to the random job eﬀects estimates reported in hTable 6i, they are also
very similar to their counterparts with ﬁrm eﬀects. For the whole sample, the union wage eﬀects
19are approximately 2.7»2.9 percent, while they stand at 4.4»4.8 percent and 0.8»0.9 percent
for male and female workers, respectively. In sum, whether we control an association between
a worker’s union status and employer characteristics by means of ﬁrm eﬀects or job eﬀects, the
estimated union wage eﬀects do not diﬀer by much, and they are very small compared to the
cross-sectional and individual panel estimates.
INSERT hTable 6i
5.3 Supplements to Main Estimation Results
The main estimation models given above have not taken into explicit consideration the following
two issues that may, more or less, aﬀect the estimates of union wage eﬀect: (1) measurement
errors associated with a worker’s (reported) union status, and (2) establishment eﬀects in con-
trast and in addition to ﬁrm eﬀects. The subsequent subsections deal with these two topics as
supplements to the main estimation and its results.
5.3.1 Adjustment of Measurement Errors
The issue of measurement errors for a worker’s union status has been one of the bias-causing
forces in the estimation of the union wage eﬀect. In our data set of the NLSY79, the measure-
ment errors may also be associated with workers’ union status. Given this possibility, we need
to control them to get a genuine estimate of the union wage eﬀect. Unfortunately, however,
there exists no external source of information available for NLSY79, that veriﬁes a worker’s true
union status23. In the face of this limitation, I try to adjust possible measurement errors of
reported union status in the following way.
I check the reported sequence of union status of an individual within the same job to ﬁnd
unreasonable changes in the status, and then correct the sequence if these changes exist. I
23Although there are some studies on the measurement (or reporting) errors for job tenures in the NLSY79
(Brown and Light (1992)), I have failed to ﬁnd corresponding research on those of the union status in the NLSY79.
20suspect that the unreasonable changes are rather likely arising from reporting errors of an
individual’s union status at a given date. The general principle I follow is that, within the same
job of an individual, if a speciﬁc year’s union status is diﬀerent from that of two (behind and
ahead) adjacent years, which are identical to each other, it is corrected to maintain the sequence.
For example, if a sequence of union status within the same job is given by 11011, the third 0 is
corrected to 1, so as to be modiﬁed as 11111. Likewise, 00100 is modiﬁed to 00000. However, if
the union status of the two adjacent years are diﬀerent (e.g. 00110) or if one of them is missing
(e.g. 001.0), I do not correct the sequence of the raw data. In addition, I do not correct the
sequence if the status alternates year by year (1101011 or 001010, for example), since I do not
know which status is aﬀected by mis-measurement. In this process of adjustment, a total of 337
modiﬁcations were made from the original matched data set. After the measurement errors were
adjusted, the proportion of union workers falls a little from the original ﬁgure of 18.2 percent
(as in hTable 1i) to 17.2 percent. hTable 7i displays the estimation results based on supposedly
correct union status.
INSERT hTable 7i
After the adjustments, the union wage eﬀect is estimated to be slightly higher (by approx-
imately 1 percentage point higher) than previously shown in models with ﬁrm and job eﬀects.
Given that measurement errors cause bias of the interesting estimates toward zero, it shows
that the reported union status of individuals has some (but not substantial) degree of errors.
According to the whole sample estimates, union workers’ wage rates are approximately 0.2»0.8
percent or 3.8»4.3 percent higher than those of non-union workers, according to the ﬁxed and
random eﬀects estimates, respectively. Likewise, the union wage eﬀect is stronger for male work-
ers than for female workers. In addition, the observation still holds that a union wage eﬀect
estimated without a control of ﬁrm eﬀects is upward-biased. The estimated union eﬀects with
21controlled ﬁrm eﬀects are, at most, a quarter of the cross-sectional estimates, and half of the
individual panel estimates with unobservable person eﬀects.
5.3.2 Consideration of Establishment Eﬀects
So far, the eﬀects of employer characteristics on workers’ wages are controlled by a single chan-
nel of ﬁrm eﬀects in the estimation. However, some studies reports the independent eﬀects
of ﬁrm and establishment on workers’ wages. Given this possibility, econometric speciﬁcations
that control the establishment eﬀects as well as the ﬁrm eﬀects (or job eﬀects) deserve to be im-
plemented. Yet, an application of these speciﬁcations to the data does not come without a price
in our case. As long as the establishment eﬀects are controlled via total number of employees in
the establishment (i.e. establishment size), which is the only measure of establishment eﬀects
available from our data set, we lose some part (roughly 20»25 percent) of observations that
have been used in the speciﬁcations with ﬁrm (or job) eﬀects only24. This loss arises due to the
fact that the ﬁrm data is obtained from outside source of administrative ﬁrm information (i.e.
COMPUSTAT, the Center for Research on Security Prices and the Directory of Corporate Af-
ﬁliation), while the establishment’s employment size is available from the NLSY79 respondents’
self-reports, which may have a lot of missing information. This loss in the number of obser-
vations induces me to choose the speciﬁcation with the ﬁrm (or job) eﬀects as a main model,
while adopting the speciﬁcation with the ﬁrm/establishment eﬀects as a supplementary one. As
hTable 8i shows, however, the estimated union wage eﬀects with the ﬁrm/establishment controls
are very similar to those of the main speciﬁcation with the ﬁrm (or job) eﬀects only, while most
of the union eﬀect estimates with the establishment control are roughly 1»1.8 percentage points
24For instance, the total number of observations that are used in the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects method for the whole
sample is 22,970 with establishment size control, while it is 29,801 without it. In case of the random ﬁrm eﬀects
method for the whole sample, it is 12,867 with the establishment control, and 15,983 without it.
22smaller than those without it25. For the whole sample, for instance, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates
for union wage eﬀect are negative 0.8»1.2 percent with the control of establishment size, while
they are positive 0.2 percent without it. The random eﬀects estimates are 0.9»1.5 percent with
such control, while they are 3.1»3.2 percent without it.
INSERT hTable 8i
6 Conclusion
Recent developments in matched employer-employee data makes it possible for labor economists
to re-address, in a more sophisticated manner, the questions that have previously been raised
and dealt with. The estimation of the true union wage premium is one of the topics that may
be reconstructed, using the matched data.
In this study, using matched data, I estimate the union wage diﬀerential with control for
an association between a worker’s union status and ﬁrm characteristics. It is shown that the
union wage eﬀect estimated in previous literature with no control for this association is exposed
to upward bias. The reason is that a worker’s union status is positively associated with ﬁrm
characteristics. A worker is more likely to become a union worker in a ﬁrm that oﬀers a higher
potential for better pay. The estimated union wage eﬀect of this study is in the approximate
range of 0.2»3.2 percent, depending on the estimation method. This estimate of union wage
eﬀect is less than a quarter of cross-sectional estimates and half of individual panel estimates
with unobservable person eﬀects. In addition, the study ﬁnds that the union wage eﬀect is
a little stronger for male workers than their female counterparts. Again, depending on the
estimation methods, a male union worker receives an approximate 0.9»4.7 percent higher wage
rate than a male non-union worker in the same ﬁrm. In contrast, a female union worker gets
25This comparison is made on the basis of the union eﬀect estimates obtained from the union-status-unadjusted
data.
23paid approximately negative 2.3 » positive 1.0 percent more than a female non-union worker in
a same ﬁrm. However, the (reported) small degree of union wage eﬀects does not imply that a
union has little capability in increasing union workers’ wages in general. As long as a union has
the power to drive upward the covariation between a worker’s union status and ﬁrm (or job)
eﬀects of compensation, it has the capability of increasing union workers’ wages and, thereby,
workers will have enough of an incentive to become union workers.
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28Table 1: Comparison between Original NLSY79 Data and Matched Data
Variable  Data Set Original NLSY Data Matched Data
Log Real Hourly Wage 6.37 6.45
($ 1984) (0.65) (0.53)




Tenure (Year) 2.57 3.21
(3.04) (3.44)





Years of Schooling 12.94 13.03
(2.40) (2.19)






Number of Observations 113,855 33,979
Number of Individuals 10,843 6,673
Note :
*) Standard deviations in parentheses.
1) I top-coded the employment size of the raw data at 10,000 in order to
lower the eﬀects of outliers.
2) Full-time worker is deﬁned as a worker working at least 35 hours a week.
29Table 2: Simplest Model with No Control of Unobservable Person Eﬀects and Firm Eﬀects
Explanatory Variables Whole Sample Male Female
Intercept 4.7227*** 4.8921*** 4.7568***
(0.0182) (0.0268) (0.0256)
Union Worker 0.1514*** 0.1792*** 0.1095***
(0.0065) (0.0087) (0.0098)
Tenure 0.0864*** 0.0850*** 0.0870***
(0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0032)
Tenure
2=10 -0.0467*** -0.0465*** -0.0469***
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Experience 0.0339*** 0.0351*** 0.0322***
(0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0042)
Experience
2=10 -0.0045*** -0.0062*** -0.0030
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0024)




White 0.0923*** 0.1124*** 0.0734***
(0.0051) (0.0073) (0.0071)
Years of Schooling 0.0841*** 0.0826*** 0.0845***
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0018)
R-Square 0.3560 0.3335 0.3220
Number of Observations 29,801 15,316 14,485
Note :
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) *, ** and *** indicate that the estimate is signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
30Table 3: Model with Unobservable Person Eﬀects Only
Fixed Eﬀects Method
Explanatory Variables Whole Sample Male Female
Union Worker 0.0737*** 0.0830*** 0.0620***
(0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0105)
Tenure 0.0443*** 0.0441*** 0.0444***
(0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Tenure
2=10 -0.0234*** -0.0247*** -0.0216***
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Experience 0.0452*** 0.0499*** 0.0401***
(0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Experience
2=10 -0.0127*** -0.0143*** -0.0109***
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0026)
R-Square 0.7717 0.7696 0.7505
Random Eﬀects Method
3)
Explanatory Variables Whole Sample Male Female
Intercept 4.7744*** 4.8530*** 4.8683***
(0.0276) (0.0426) (0.0403)
Union Worker 0.0741*** 0.0829*** 0.0627***
(0.0072) (0.0097) (0.0106)
Tenure 0.0447*** 0.0439*** 0.0452***
(0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Tenure
2=10 -0.0228*** -0.0238*** -0.0212***
(0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0027)
Experience 0.0372*** 0.0392*** 0.0348***
(0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0049)
Experience
2=10 -0.0109*** -0.0115*** -0.0102***
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0026)




White 0.0681*** 0.1123*** 0.0367***
(0.0084) (0.0126) (0.0115)
Years of Schooling 0.0781*** 0.0798*** 0.0748***
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Number of Observations 29,801 15,316 14,485
Number of Individuals 6,346 3,156 3,190
Note :
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) *, ** and *** indicate that the estimate is signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
3) The estimation results for person means of union status, tenure, experience,
their higher terms, and variance components of unobservable person eﬀect
are suppressed. They are available from the author upon request.
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